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Abstract 
Conspiracy theories offer simple answers to complex problems by providing 
explanations for uncertain situations. Thus, they should be attractive to individuals who are 
intolerant of uncertainty and seek cognitive closure. We hypothesized that need for cognitive 
closure (NFCC) should foster conspiracy beliefs about events that lack clear official 
explanations, especially when conspiracy theories are temporarily salient. In Experiment 1 
NFCC positively predicted the endorsement of a conspiracy theory behind the refugee crisis, 
especially when conspiratorial explanations were made salient. Experiment 2 showed that 
when conspiratorial explanations were made salient, NFCC positively predicted beliefs in 
conspiracies behind a mysterious plane crash. However, the link between NFCC and beliefs in 
conspiratorial explanations was reversed in the case of a plane crash with an official, non-
conspiratorial, explanation for the accident. In conclusion, people high (vs. low) in NFCC 
seize on conspiratorial explanations for uncertain events when such explanations are 
situationally accessible.  
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Addicted to answers: 
Need for cognitive closure and the endorsement of conspiracy beliefs 
 Perceiving the world as a place where there is no coincidence, and where everything is 
planned and controlled is usually connected with beliefs in God (Laurin, Kay, & Moscovitch, 
2008). However, as the existence of good is always accompanied by the existence of evil, 
some individuals believe that threatening random events are in fact a consequence of secret 
actions performed by a group of malevolent people (Imhoff & Bruder, 2014; Kofta & 6ĊGHN 
2005). By explaining how secret organizations covertly influence or cause major world 
events, conspiracy theories give simple and structured answers for difficult questions. It is, 
therefore, not surprising that they are often activated in the context of threat to individual and 
collective needs (Kossowska & Bukowski, 2015). Research has demonstrated that adopting 
conspiracy beliefs has been previously linked to lack of personal control (Whitson & 
Galinsky, 2008), uncertainty (van Prooijen & Jostmann, 2013; Whitson, Galinsky, & Kay, 
2015), powerlessness (Abalakina-Paap, Stephan, Craig, & Gregory, 1999; Jolley & Douglas, 
2014), feelings of relative deprivation (Bilewicz, Winiewski, Kofta, & Wójcik, 2013), 
threatened in-group identification (Cichocka, Marchlewska, Golec de Zavala, & Olechowski, 
2015) and threatened self-esteem (Cichocka, Marchlewska, & Golec de Zavala, 2015). 
Conspiracy thinking is a mindset connected with searching for explanations. Thus, it has been 
suggested that it should be associated with the epistemic motivation to reduce uncertainty and 
ambiguity by forming quick judgements (Kossowska & Bukowski, 2015) ² often referred to 
as the need for cognitive closure (Kruglanski & Webster, 1996). Nevertheless, direct evidence 
for the positive link between need for cognitive closure and conspiracy beliefs has been 
lacking (e.g., Imhoff & Bruder, 2014; Leman & Cinnirella, 2013). In this research, we seek to 
examine if the nature of this relationship may depend whether conspiratorial explanations 
related to a particular event are temporarily salient (vs. not). 
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 Feelings of uncertainty make it difficult to anticipate events or plan actions, and they 
seem especially aversive when an individual does not have resources to deal with this type of 
threat (Fiske & Taylor, 199; Hogg & Adelman, 2013). A need to immediately eliminate 
uncertainty and find clear beliefs about reality is especially important for people high in need 
for cognitive closure (Kruglanski & Webster, 1996), who are determined to form quick 
judgements on any given topic (Kruglanski, 1990). In line with this reasoning, Roets and Van 
Hiel (2008) found that when closure is not attainable, people high in need for cognitive 
closure report distress and show an increased arousal assessed via a galvanic skin response. 
To reduce this aversive state, they demonstrate a heightened susceptibility to the primacy 
effect in impression formation and seize on any easily accessible information that assures 
closure (Freund, Kruglanski, & Shpitzajzen, 1985; Kruglanski & Webster, 1996; Webster & 
Kruglanski, 1994). This often results in biased knowledge formation and making choices 
based on partial evidence. Moreover, such decisions may be hard to modify, as an inclination 
to keep the closure leads to the process of freezing on the acquired information (Kruglanski, 
Freund, & Bar-Tal, 1996; Roets, Kruglanski, Kossowska, Pierro, & Hong, 2015).  
 Research conducted in the context of intergroup relations shows that temporarily 
salient cognitive schemas have crucial impact on the decision-making process among 
individuals high in need for cognitive closure (Golec & Federico, 2004; Golec de Zavala, 
Federico, CisáDN & Sigger, 2008). For example, need for cognitive closure is positively 
linked to making sharp distinctions between ingroups and outgroups which leads to 
preference for competitive behaviors over cooperation. Golec de Zavala and colleagues 
(2008) showed that this relationship may be even stronger when a competitive schema is 
temporarily salient, and on the other hand ± significantly weaker when a cooperative schema 
is salient. Similarly, Kossowska and Van Hiel (2003) demonstrated that need for cognitive 
closure was positively related to the endorsement of political views that are chronically salient 
RUNINNG HEAD: Need for cognitive closure and conspiracy beliefs                                   5 
 
in a given political context, irrespective of whether these views were left-wing or right-wing. 
As the need for cognitive closure is associated with heuristic information processing based on 
easily accessible schemas (Kossowska & Bukowski, 2015; Webster & Kruglanski, 1994), we 
suggest that it may be linked to adopting conspiratorial explanations for unexplained events 
but only when a conspiratorial schema is made salient.  
Recent empirical research by Imhoff and Bruder (2014) or Leman and Cinnirella 
(Study 1; 2013) examined the correlation between need for cognitive closure and beliefs in 
conspiracy theories but found this correlation to be weak and non-significant. One reason for 
these weak relationships could be that none of these studies examined the link between need 
for cognitive closure and conspiracy beliefs in a context in which conspiracy theories would 
be particularly accessible to the individual. In one of their studies, Leman & Cinnirella (2013; 
Study 2) examined adopting salient conspiratorial explanations for a fictitious situation among 
participants with experimentally lowered need for cognitive closure versus those in a control 
research condition. They found no significant differences between conditions, but the study 
did not include a high need for cognitive closure condition. Nevertheless, the results showed 
that lowering the need for cognitive closure led to analyzing both pro- and anti-conspiracy 
evidence in a more detailed manner (Leman & Cinnirella, 2013). This is in line with studies 
linking the need for cognitive closure to lower levels of scrutiny in analyzing evidence (Ford 
& Kruglanski, 1995; Klein & Webster, 2000). As lower levels of scrutiny and lower analytic 
thinking have also been found to be related to stronger belief in conspiracy theories (Swami, 
Voracek, Steiger, Tran, & Furnham, 2014), one may expect that people high in the need for 
cognitive closure should adopt conspiratorial explanations when conspiratorial explanations 
are salient and cannot be easily replaced by a different scenario. 
Overview of the current research 
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The aim of the current research was to provide a more complex understanding of the 
relationship between need for cognitive closure and the endorsement of conspiratorial 
explanations for major events. Need for cognitive closure is connected with desire for 
predictability, preference for structure and intolerance to ambiguity. It urges the individual to 
attain closure as soon as possible (Roets et al., 2015). Conspiracy beliefs meet those 
expectations by offering structured maps of meaning, and giving simple explanations for 
uncertain situations (Kossowska & Bukowski, 2015). In line with this reasoning, we assumed 
that need for cognitive closure should predict the endorsement of conspiratorial explanations 
for major events but only when conspiratorial explanations are easily accessible. In other 
words, we proposed that when faced with ambiguous events accompanied by conspiratorial 
explanations, individuals high in QHHGIRUFRJQLWLYHFORVXUHVKRXOG³VHL]H´DQG³IUHH]H´ on 
conspiracy beliefs. 
We tested our assumptions in two experimental studies. In both experiments, we 
measured need for cognitive closure as the independent variable. Experiment 1 manipulated 
exposure to conspiracy explanations for the arrival of refugees to Poland. We hypothesized 
that participants high in the need for cognitive closure would be more likely to rely on the 
conspiratorial explanation when it was made salient (compared to the control condition). In 
Experiment 2 we tested whether exposure to conspiracy explanations (compared to the control 
condition) would affect the link between need for cognitive closure and conspiracy beliefs for 
a mysterious plane crash, compared to a plane crash with confirmed non-conspiratorial 
causes. We assumed that participants high in need for cognitive closure would rely on 
conspiratorial explanations for an uncertain (vs. certain) event only when such explanations 
are made salient (vs. not). However, when the non-conspiratorial causes for the plane crash 
are known and certain, participants high in need for cognitive closure should freeze on them 
and, thus, reject salient conspiratorial explanations. Taking into consideration that conspiracy 
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theories are often spread through the internet (see HIV denial conspiracy; Smith & Novella, 
2007), we prepared our manipulations as imitations of online articles and conducted our 
experiments among internet users. 
Experiment 1 
In Experiment 1 we tested the hypothesis that need for cognitive closure would be 
related to relying on conspiratorial explanation for a major event when a conspiratorial 
explanation was made salient:HIRFXVHGRQ3RODQG¶VDJUHHPHQWWRRIIHUDV\OXPWRUHIXJHHV
from Syria and Eritrea as a part of the European Union relocation and resettlement 
programme. This decision likely caused uncertainty among Polish residents. Ethnically, 
Poland is a very homogenous country which often results in negative attitudes toward 
foreigners who do not share Polish traditions. According to the results of a survey conducted 
by one of the leading Polish public opinion research institutions, 78% of Poles linked refugees 
arrival to reduced levels of safety, and only 5% declared that Poland should comply with EU 
directives and allow refugees to settle in Poland (CBOS, 2015). Also, political rhetoric on the 
refugee crisis strengthened the feelings of uncertainty among people living in Poland. For 
example, Jaroslaw Kaczynski, leader of Poland's ruling Law and Justice Party, claimed that 
refugees could bring dangerous disease and parasites to Poland (Goclowski, Barteczko, & 
Koper, 2015). Thus, we believed that in the face of such threats combined with a fear of the 
unknown ³RWKHU´individuals high in cognitive closure should be especially prone to rely on 
conspiratorial explanation standing behind refugees¶arrival. In the study, we manipulated 
conspiracy salience by suggesting (or not) that the European Union is secretly planning 
hostile actions against Poland to gain power and control over it.  
Method 
Participants.  
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Experiment 1 was conducted among 245 Polish internet users. The whole sample 
consisted of 132 women and 112 men (1 person did not specify his/her gender). The age of 
the participants ranged from 14 to 88 years (Mage = 36.93, SD = 14.21). Participation was 
voluntary and anonymous, with no remuneration offered to participants1.  
Procedure. 
At the beginning of the study participants were asked to fill out the measure of the 
need for cognitive closure. Then, all of the participants read a short text concerning the EU 
plans for rescue of Syrian and Eritrean refugees by financing their stay in Poland. The main 
text was prepared as an imitation of an online article. Participants were randomly assigned to 
one of two experimental conditions, which differed by the type of material presented below 
the main text.  
Participants in the conspiracy-salience condition (n =  118) were exposed to an alleged 
internet conversation blaming the EU for conducting secret actions against Poland. According 
to the comments, refugees¶ arrivals in Poland and supporting their stay by the EU were 
arranged to evoke chaos and gain power over Poland (e.g., ³The EU will do everything to 
bring refugees specifically to Poland. This will evoke chaos and allow the EU to do whatever 
they want with Poland .´ or ³The EU funds? One day we will have to pay them back for all 
these donations.´). In the control condition (n =  127) participants were exposed to internet 
comments which were unrelated to conspiratorial thinking and DSSURYHGWKH(8¶s rescuing 
                                                          
1
 In both experiments we sought to recruit at lHDVWSDUWLFLSDQWV³SHUFHOl´ which is in line 
ZLWKWKH6LPRQVRKQ1HOVRQ	6LPPRQV¶UXOHRIWKXPERIn !³SHUFHOO.´ 
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action (e.g., ³It is beneficial for Poles that the EU funds this action instead of asking Polish 
citizens to do it.´)2.    
Afterwards, participants answered the questions about their belief in the EU¶V 
conspiracy standing behind the arrival of refugees in Poland.  
Measures. 
Need for cognitive closure was measured using a short, 15-item, version of the Polish 
Need for Cognitive Closure scale (Kossowska, Hanusz & Trejtowicz, 2012). Participants 
were asked to rate each statement on a scale from 1 = completely disagree to 6 = completely 
agree, Į = .67, M = 3.74, SD = 0.52. A higher mean score indicated a higher need for 
cognitive closure. 
Conspiracy beliefs were measured with six items: 1)³7KH(8KLGHVWKHUHDOUHDVRQs 
for binging refugees into Poland. ´, 2)³7KH(8RIIHUV help to the refugees selflessly´reverse 
coded), 3)³7KH(8VSUHDGVWKHZRUOGDERXWUHIXJHHV¶VLWXDWLRQ to divert the ZRUOG¶s attention 
from the EU¶V real SODQV´, 4)³7KH(8EULQJVUHIXJHHVWR3RODQGWRGHVWUR\3ROLVKFXOWXUH´, 
5) ³7KH(8VHFUHWO\SODQVWRWDNHSRZHURYHUthe 3ROLVKHFRQRP\´6) ³7KH(8¶VSODQWRKHOS
refugees, that they present to Poland, is authentic.´ (reverse coded). Participants were asked to 
rate each statement on a scale from 1 = completely disagree to 6 = completely agree, Į = .89, 
M = 2.99, SD = 1.42. A higher mean score indicated higher conspiracy beliefs.  
Results and Discussion 
                                                          
2
 In Experiment 1 we also measured collective narcissism (Golec de Zavala, Cichocka, 
Eidelson, & Jayawickreme, 2009) for the purpose of different research. 
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First, we computed the correlation between the need for cognitive closure and 
conspiracy beliefs across conditions. We found a significant positive relationship between 
these variables, r (243) = .22, p = .001. We then performed a hierarchical multiple regression 
analysis to investigate whether this relationship was moderated by the experimental 
conditions. Need for cognitive closure was mean-centered prior to the analyses. Experimental 
conditions were coded -1 = control condition and 1 = conspiracy-salience condition.  
In the first step we investigated the effects of the need for cognitive closure and the 
experimental condition on conspiracy beliefs; F (2, 242) = 6.55, p = .002, R2 = .05. We found 
a positive significant effect of need for cognitive closure, B = 0.60, SE = 0.17, p = .001, but no 
significant independent effect of experimental condition, B = 0.09, SE = 0.09, p = .31.  
In the second step we introduced a two-way interaction of the need for cognitive 
closure and the experimental condition. We found a significant positive effect of need for 
cognitive closure, B = 0.64, SE = 0.17, p < .001, but no significant effect of experimental 
condition, B = 0.09, SE = 0.09, p = .30. The interaction of need for cognitive closure and 
experimental condition was significant, B = 0.34, SE = 0.17, p = .046; for the whole model, 
F(3, 241) = 5.77, p = .001; R2 = .07, ǻR2= .02. Simple slope analysis indicated that need for 
cognitive closure significantly and positively predicted conspiracy beliefs in the conspiracy-
salience condition, B = 0.97, SE = 0.25, p < .001, and positively, albeit non-significantly, in 
the control condition, B = 0.29, SE = 0.23, p = .20 (Figure 1). 
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Figure 1. Interaction effect of need for cognitive closure and conspiracy-salience (vs. control) 
condition on conspiracy beliefs.   
Note. *** p < .001. 
Experiment 1 confirmed that need for cognitive closure was linked to the endorsement 
of conspiratorial explanations behind refugees arrival in Poland. However, this effect was 
stronger when the conspiratorial explanation was made salient. People high in need for 
cognitive closure who were exposed to the conspiracy blaming European Union for secret 
actions against Poland, were more likely to believe that the tragic situation of Syrian and 
Eritrean refugees was just a mystification. Apparently, they were ready to accept a coherent, 
and certain story according to which the European Union sends refugees to Poland in order to 
gain power over its economy or destroy Polish culture. These results provided initial 
confirmation of our hypothesis in the context of reactions to the influx of foreigners WRRQH¶V

















Conspiracy-salience condition Control condition
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Experiment 2 
In Experiment 2 we aimed to replicate the pattern of results obtained in Experiment 1. 
We further examined whether the endorsement of salient conspiracy theories by those high in 
need for cognitive closure will depend on whether the event did or did not have a clear official 
explanation. Individuals high in need for cognitive closure demonstrate a heightened 
susceptibility to the primacy effect in impression formation and seize on easily accessible 
information assuring closure (Freund, et el., 1985; Kruglanski & Webster, 1996; Webster & 
Kruglanski, 1994). Thus, we expected the strongest link between need for cognitive closure 
and the endorsement of conspiracy theories when these theories are made salient, but at the 
same time a more plausible official explanation is lacking (i.e., participants experience 
uncertainty about the cause of the event). However, when official, non-conspiratorial, causes 
of the event assure certainty, people high in need for cognitive closure should focus on these 
official explanations and as a result reject salient conspiratorial beliefs which are inconsistent 
with previously collected information. We examined our hypothesis in a different context that 
is frequently associated with the spreading of conspiracy theories²major plane catastrophes. 
Specifically, we predicted that in the context of uncertainty about the explanation for a plane 
crash, we would observe a stronger link between the need for cognitive closure and 
conspiracy beliefs than in the context of certain, official explanations. However, basing on the 
results of Study 1 we expect this effect to be observed only when the conspiracy theories 
about the plane crash are made salient (vs. not).3  
In the uncertainty condition we used the story of Malaysia Airlines Boeing 777 which 
disappeared with 239 passengers on board on 8th March 2014 during a flight from Kuala 
Lumpur to Beijing. In spite of massive international action, for 16 months no trace of the 
                                                          
3
 We obtained initial evidence for this hypothesis in a pilot study. See the Supplement for 
details.  
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plane had been found. In July 2015 fragments of the plane were discovered on the island of 
Reunion. Still, there is no knowledge about what exactly happened to the plane after it 
disappeared from the radar and what caused its crash. In the certainty condition we used the 
story of the Germanwings Airbus A320 plane crash which took place on 24th March 2015 
when the airplane was flying from Barcelona to Düsseldorf, suddenly lost height and began an 
unexplained descent into North Alps. All 150 passengers were killed. On 27th of March 2015 
was the day when media reported that it was the pilot ± Andreas Lubitz ± suffering from 
mental health illness who deliberately destroyed the plane (Knolle, 2015) and that there was 
therefore no conspiracy. We collected data in September-November of 2015, after non-
conspiratorial explanation for this tragic event was officially confirmed and announced by 
international media.  
As in Experiment 1, we hypothesized that people high in need for cognitive closure 
would endorse conspiratorial explanations standing behind the uncertain event (i.e., Malaysia 
Airlines Boeing 777 crash) when the conspiracy theories were made salient. Moreover, we 
assumed that people high in need for cognitive closure would reject conspiratorial 
explanations standing behind a certain event (i.e., Germanwings Airbus A320) even when the 
conspiracy theories were made salient. Because the study was conducted in Poland, the 
conspiracy salience manipulation was based on the Smolensk conspiracy theory which is 
popular among Poles and refers to the alleged conspiratorial causes of the plane crash that 
killed the Polish president, the first lady and almost one hundred government officials in 
2010. After this event, many Poles believed that Russians tend to assassinate their political 
enemies by secret air attacks (Grzesiak-Feldman & Haska, 2012). Thus, in the conspiracy 
salience condition we suggested Russian involvement in the plane crash. 
Method 
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Participants.  
Experiment 2 was conducted among 455 Polish internet users. The sample consisted 
of 314 women and 137 men. The age of the participants ranged from 15 to 93 years (Mage = 
30.16, SD = 12.84). Participation was voluntary and anonymous, with no remuneration 
offered to participants.  
Procedure. 
First, participants were asked to fill out the measure of need for cognitive closure. 
Next, they were randomly assigned to one of the experimental conditions. The study design 
employed a 2 (event certainty vs. event uncertainty) x 2 (conspiracy-salience vs. control) 
manipulation.  
We manipulated certainty (vs. uncertainty) of the explanation by having participants 
read stories concerning a plane crash which was caused by officially known (vs. unknown) 
factors. Participants in the event uncertainty condition (n =  230) read a short text about the 
story of the unexplained disappearance of the Malaysia Airlines Boeing 777 plane and were 
explicitly reminded that the causes of the event still remained unknown. Participants in the 
certainty condition (n =  225) read a short text concerning the story of the Germanwings 
Airbus A320 plane crash and were explicitly reminded about the known causes of the crash. 
In both conditions the main text was prepared as an imitation of an online article.   
The second experimental manipulation was similar to that used in Experiment 1. 
Participants in the conspiracy-salience condition (n =  224) were exposed to internet 
comments blaming Russians for conducting secret actions to destroy the plane (e.g., 
³5XVVLDQVKDYHDOZD\VKDGWHQGHQF\WRSODQDQGFRPPLWVXFKFULPHV«´RU³Indeed, it cannot 
be ruled out that Russians are behind this.´,QWKHcontrol condition (n =  231) participants 
RUNINNG HEAD: Need for cognitive closure and conspiracy beliefs                                   15 
 
were exposed to internet comments which were unrelated to conspiratorial thinking (e.g., 
³Sad«´RU³I cannot believe it´).    
Afterwards, participants answered the questions about conspiracy beliefs for a plane 
crash that they read about.   
Measures. 
Need for cognitive closure was measured using a short, 15-item, version of the Polish 
Need for Cognitive Closure scale (Kossowska et al, 2012), as in Experiment 1, Į = .74, M = 
3.62, SD = 0.57. A higher mean score indicated a higher need for cognitive closure. 
Conspiracy beliefs were measured with four items:1)³7KHreal cause of the crash lays 
in the secret activities of a certain group of people.´2) ³The truth about the cause of the crash 
was covered up by a certain groups of people.´, 3) ³7KHGHVWUXFWLRQRQWKHSODQH was 
carefully planned by a certain group of pHRSOH´4) ³7KRVHZKRZLOOWU\WRHVWDEOLVKWKHWUXWK
DERXWWKHFDXVHRIWKHFUDVKZLOOQRWEHDOORZHGWRVSHDN´Į = .93, M = 2.48, SD = 1.31. A 
higher mean score indicated higher conspiracy beliefs.  
Results and Discussion 
First, we computed the correlation between need for closure and conspiracy beliefs 
across conditions. Unlike Study 1, this correlation was non-significant, r (453) = .02, p = .71. 
Second, the independent t-test revealed that participants in the uncertainty condition showed 
higher conspiracy belief (M = 2.80, SD =1.34) than participants in the certainty condition (M 
= 2.15, SD = 1.19), t (453) = -5.47, p < .001, which is in line with previous research linking 
uncertainty to adopting conspiracy beliefs (van Prooijen & Jostmann, 2013; Whitson et al., 
2015).    
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Finally, we performed a hierarchical multiple regression analysis to investigate the 
effects of need for cognitive closure on conspiracy beliefs in interaction with variables coding 
both experimental manipulations. Need for cognitive closure was mean-centered prior to the 
analyses. Event certainty manipulation was coded as -1 = uncertainty  and 1 = certainty  
condition. Conspiracy-salience manipulation was coded -1 = control and 1 = conspiracy-
salience condition.  
In the first step we investigated the effects of the need for cognitive closure and the 
experimental conditions on conspiracy beliefs; F (3, 449) = 11.54, p < .001, R2 = .07. We 
found a negative significant effect of certainty condition, B = -0.34, SE = 0.06, p < .001, 
indicating that participants were more likely to endorse conspiracy beliefs about the uncertain 
(Malaysia Airlines) than the certain (Germanwings) flight. We also found a non-significant 
effect of conspiracy-salience condition, B = 0.03, SE = 0.10, p = .75, indicating that, as in 
Study 1, exposure to conspiracy theories was not enough to increase their endorsement among 
our participants. Finally, we found a non-significant effect of need for cognitive closure, B = 
0.03, SE = 0.10, p = .48, on conspiracy beliefs.   
In the second step we introduced three two-way interactions between all the predictors; 
F (6, 446) = 6.38, p < .001, R2 = .08, ǻR2= .01, p = .31. We found a negative significant effect 
of certainty condition, B = -0.34, SE = 0.06, p < .001, no significant effects of conspiracy-
salience experimental condition, B = 0.04, SE = 0.06, p = .54, or need for cognitive closure, B 
= 0.02, SE = 0.10, p = .83, on conspiracy beliefs. The two-way interactions between: (1) need 
for cognitive closure and conspiracy-salience research condition, B = -0.07, SE = 0.10, p = 
.50, and (2) conspiracy-salience and certainty research conditions, B = 0.02, SE = 0.06, p = 
.72, were non-significant. We only found a marginally significant two-way interaction 
between (3) need for cognitive closure and certainty condition, B = -0.18, SE = 0.10, p = .09. 
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In the third step we introduced a three-way interaction between all the predictors. We 
found a negative significant effect of certainty condition, B = -0.35, SE = 0.06, p < .001, no 
significant effects of conspiracy-salience experimental condition, B = 0.03, SE = 0.06, p = .61, 
or need for cognitive closure, B = 0.04, SE = 0.10, p = .40, on conspiracy beliefs. The two-
way interactions between: (1) need for cognitive closure and conspiracy-salience research 
condition, B = -0.07, SE = 0.10, p = .50, and (2) conspiracy-salience and certainty research 
conditions, B = 0.02, SE = 0.06, p = .73, were non-significant. We also found a marginally 
significant two-way interaction between (3) need for cognitive closure and certainty 
condition, B = -0.19, SE = 0.10, p = .06. However, this interaction was qualified by a 
significant three-way interaction between need for cognitive closure, conspiracy-salience 
research condition and certainty research condition, B = -0.22, SE = 0.10, p = .03; for the 
whole model F (7, 445) = 6.16, p < .001, R2 = .09, ǻR2= .01, p = .034.  
Further analyses revealed that the interaction effect of need for cognitive closure and 
certainty research condition was significant for conspiracy-salience condition, B = -0.42, SE = 
0.15, p = .01 (Figure 2), and non-significant for the control condition, B = 0.03, SE = 0.14, p = 
                                                          
4
 The present analysis was performed with the exclusion of two observations detected as 
outliers with residuals larger than 3 standard deviations away from the mean (Barnett & 
Lewis, 1994; Chatterjee & Hadi, 2006; Hadi & Velleman, 1997). The pattern of results 
remains similar when data for these participants is retained ± we obtain a significant effect of 
certainty condition, B = -0.33, SE = 0.06, p < .001, a significant two-way interaction between 
NFCC and certainty condition, B = -0.21, SE = 0.11, p = .04, and marginally significant three-
way interaction between NFCC, conspiracy-salience research condition and certainty research 
condition, B = -0.20, SE = 0.11, p = .056; for the whole model F (7, 447) = 5.36, p < .001, R2 
= .08 (see Supplement for details). Note that no residual outliers were detected in Study 1.  
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.84 (Figure 3). Simple slope analysis indicated that in the conspiracy-salience research 
condition, the effect of need for cognitive closure on conspiracy beliefs was positive and 
marginally significant in the uncertainty condition, B = 0.39, SE = 0.22, p = .08, and negative 
and significant in the certainty condition, B = -0.44, SE = 0.21, p = .04.    
v
 
Figure 2. Interaction effect of need for cognitive closure and certainty (vs. uncertainty) 
condition on conspiracy beliefs among those in the conspiracy-salience condition.  
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Figure 3. Interaction effect of need for cognitive closure and certainty (vs. uncertainty) 
condition on conspiracy beliefs among those in the control condition. 
Experiment 2 revealed that the relationship between need for cognitive closure and 
conspiracy beliefs was moderated both by the salience of conspiratorial explanations as well 
as the certainty about the causes of the event. Among those participants who read story about 
an event with well-known causes (high certainty) accompanied by a conspiratorial 
explanation, need for cognitive closure was negatively related to conspiracy beliefs. However, 
among those participants who read a story about an event with unknown causes (high 
uncertainty), need for cognitive closure was positively related to conspiracy beliefs when the 
conspiratorial explanations were made salient (although the latter effect was marginally 
significant and should be treated with caution). It seems that people high in need for cognitive 
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mysterious, events but at the same time are easily accessible. However, salient conspiratorial 
beliefs that refer to certain event, with well-known non-conspiratorial causes, are simply 
inconsistent with previously gained information. In this case, people high in need for 
cognitive closure reject them ± probably focusing on the official, non-conspiratorial 
explanations. 
General Discussion 
In two experiments we examined the relationship between the epistemic need for 
cognitive closure and the endorsement of conspiratorial explanations for major events. In both 
studies need for cognitive closure was a robust predictor of adopting conspiratorial 
explanations for uncertain events, but only when such explanations were made salient. In 
Experiment 1, participants high in need for closure were more likely to endorse a conspiracy 
theory behind the influx of refugees but this effect was especially pronounced when a 
conspiracy theory was suggested to participants. In Experiment 2, participants high in need 
for cognitive closure were more likely to endorse a conspiracy theory behind a plane crash 
when this conspiracy was salient. This was only the case when non-conspiratorial official 
explanations for the crash were lacking. When other causes for the plane crash were easily 
available to participants instead, those high in cognitive closure were more likely to reject 
conspiracy theories.  
In Experiment 1 the correlation between need for cognitive closure and conspiracy 
beliefs was significantly positive. On the other hand, in Experiment 2 we found this 
relationship to be significant only in the case of uncertain situations accompanied by 
conspiratorial explanations. The current findings shed light on why previous research might 
have failed to find a link between need for cognitive closure and conspiracy beliefs (Imhoff & 
Bruder, 2014; Leman & Cinnirella, 2013). It seems that this relationship is more complex and 
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dependent on what sort of explanations are temporarily available to the individual. When the 
official causes of a particular event are well-known and assure closure, those high in need for 
cognitive closure might not have a reason for entertaining conspiracy theories. In fact, when 
alternative explanations are available, individuals high in need for cognitive closure are likely 
to freeze on them and become immune to any contradictory information that cannot be easily 
assimilated into existing schema (Kruglanski et al., 1996; Roets et al., 2015). Under these 
circumstances, those with high need for cognitive closure can reject any salient conspiracy 
theories.  
Nevertheless, when the situation is complex and uncertain, conspiracy beliefs may 
serve as a map of meaning for those individuals who are determined to get any answer. Under 
these circumstances, individuals high in need for cognitive closure are likely to seize on 
salient conspiratorial explanations. In other words, when facing uncertainty combined with 
conspiracy-salience environment, those high in need for cognitive closure rely on the easily 
accessible schema of a conspiracy theory. We suggest that, in this case, conspiracy theories 
which represent closed, certain and structured mode of thinking would serve to provide 
closure and certainty (Kossowska & Bukowski, 2015). Our results were consistent with this 
theorizing and demonstrated that those high in need for cognitive closure use the available 
cues in forming their judgements about major world events. These findings are in line with 
past research showing that need for cognitive closure is associated with the endorsement of 
social and political attitudes that are temporarily or chronically available (e.g., Golec & 
Federico, 2004; Golec de Zavala et al., 2008; Kossowska & Van Hiel, 2003).  
The current findings also corroborate and extend previous work on the role of 
uncertainty in interpreting evidence for conspiracy theories. In a series of studies Van 
Prooijen and Jostmann (2013) demonstrated that under conditions of uncertainty (vs. 
certainty), participants were more likely to use information about the immorality of authorities 
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to form conspiracy theories about their actions. Our studies indicate that this may be the case 
especially among individuals high in need for cognitive closure, who are more likely to attend 
to salient cues that help them interpret reality (Kruglanski, 1990; Kruglanski & Webster, 
1996). Future research, however, would do well to better establish causality of described 
relationship by manipulating need for cognitive closure directly. Potentially fertile ground for 
future research would be also to investigate if conspiratorial beliefs fully compensate feelings 
of uncertainty and discourage those high in need for cognitive closure from searching for 
alternative explanations. Due to the fact that we manipulated conspiracy-salience using an 
alleged internet conversation, our results should be interpreted in terms of susceptibility to 
endorsing available conspiracy theories rather than in terms of actively generating conspiracy 
theories. More research is needed to explore whether individuals high, or rather low, in need 
for cognitive closure would also be prone to engage in generating conspiratorial explanations 
for major world events.  
Furthermore, when exploring the relationship between need for cognitive closure and 
seizing on salient conspiratorial explanations different mediators should be taken into 
consideration. For example, the relationships we observed may be at least partially accounted 
for by right-wing authoritarianism or out-group prejudice that are often positively related to 
need for cognitive closure (Chirumbolo, 2002; Kossowska & Van Hiel, 2003) and belief in 
conspiracy theories (Golec de Zavala & Cichocka, 2012; Imhoff & Bruder, 2014). Last but 
not least, it is important to note that the effects we observed were small. Future research 
should seek to replicate these findings and investigate their potential moderators and 
boundary conditions.  
Overall, the current results help us understand the psychological predispositions that 
make people prone to endorse conspiracy theories after being briefly exposed to them. We 
hope that they can inform not only the social psychological study of the conspiracy beliefs, 
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but also prove useful for those who seek to decrease the prevalence of potentially harmful 
conspiracy theories (see Douglas, Sutton, Jolley, & Wood, 2015; Jolley & Douglas, 2014).   
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